Radikal, Turkey
By CENGIZ ÇANDAR Edited by Bridgette Blight
Translated By Garabet Moumdjian
23 November 2008
The signing of the SOFA agreement between the USA and Iraq early last week made it possible for the American army to pull out of Iraq by 2011 and to pull back from the cities by June 2009, enabled the Iraqi authorities to assume the authority and sovereignty over its cities and towns. This incident was met with mixed feelings in Turkish governmental circles. Some Turkish circles were dismayed that by June 2009, when the Iraqi airspace would come under the sovereignty of the Iraqi government, its ability to use that airspace for security purposes would be undermined. It so happens that while this airspace was under American control, Turkish military airplanes could bomb PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) targets in Northern Iraq at will and without any repercussions. What would happen now if the Iraqi government attempts to ban such a move by Turkey? This would really be a big problem for Turkey!
That this ban can now be publicly discussed is in itself a problem for Turkish authorities. This means that what had been agreed upon with the American military administration in Iraq since November 2007, and which enabled the Turkish military and especially its air force to fight the PKK will not be possible any more. Leaving aside the intelligence cooperation between the American and the Turkish military, Turkey, after June 2009, will be banned from such preemptive attacks over Iraqi air space. It seems that when the time comes we will be faced with an Iraqi opposition against such maneuvers by our air force.
Turkish political authorities had no problems as long as Iraqi air space was under the control of the American military. This was obvious in the declaration that Turkish Prime Minister Rajap Tayyip Erdogan made at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. last week. While there, Erdogan also asked president elect Barack Obama to reconsider his scheme of early military withdrawal from Iraq by sending a commission there, which would advise him on the repercussions of such a withdrawal.
It is awkward that the SOFA agreement pours directly into Obama’s policy of early withdrawal from Iraq, which creates an impasse for Turkey, especially since the agreement legitimizes the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq in accordance with the time table found in the body of the agreement itself.
What I want to stress here is that this fear within Turkish political circles is unfounded. It is true that point 3 of article 9 of the SOFA agreement states that “with this agreement Iraqi air space passes to Iraqi sovereignty,” however, one must also read point 4 of the same article, which states:
“Iraq can ask the American military authorities to assume the sovereignty of its air space.” However, this must be read in conjunction with point number 1 of the same article, which states: “In its efforts to fight against Al Qaida and other terrorist groups operating from within and without Iraqi territories, the Iraqi government can ask for the help and cooperation of the American military authorities in Iraq.”
If this reading of the SOFA agreement’s article is coupled with what Iraqi Prime Minister Nureddin Al Maliki declared, as well as Iraqi Interior Minister Bashir Atalay said during the meeting of the Commission of 3 regarding the PKK issue, then the unfounded fear within Turkish political circles regarding the issue becomes clear.
This means that Turkish military planes can continue their operations against PKK positions in Northern Iraq even after the June 2009 deadline.
In my opinion the issue then is not in this. It is in a totally different place. It is in the territorial integrity of Iraq. The SOFA agreement, which still awaits the ratification of the Iraqi Parliament during this week, has already shown how defragmented and weak this territorial integrity is. The highest Shiite authority in the country, Ayatollah Sistani, had already declared that the SOFA agreement must have the consensus of the Iraqi people. This aside, the ratification of the agreement was imbued in fears during last week. Even if the SOFA agreement is accepted or not, it is hard to envision that it will lead to the restoration of law and order in the country. For Turkey, this means that the implementation of the agreement in the short, medium, or distant future is not yet ascertained.
In the present Iraq is maligned with the following issues:
-The Shiite-Sunni problem
-The Shiite-Shiite problem
-The Sunni-Sunni problem
-The Arab-Kurdish problem
All these issues will be magnified once the USA pulls out of the country. The Shiite center of gravity, which is for now the Daawa party of Prime Minister Nureddin Al Maliki, is at odds with Abdul Aziz Al Hakim’s SCIRI (Supreme Council of Islamic Republic of Iraq) and Muqtada Al Sadr’s forces. Therefore, an intra-Shiite strife is not discounted.
After years of fighting the Sunni insurgency in Al Anbar Province, the Americans have finally found an ally in the Sunni tribes there. They were able to position the tribes against Al Qaida by signing a long term agreement with the heads of the Sunni tribes. These Sunni forces are now united and are developing under what is called the “Al Sahwa” confederation. Al Sahwa has gone a long way in marginalizing the Islamic Party of Tariq Al Hashimi, which is the dominant Sunni faction within the parliament. Al Hashimi’s party’s position is at best lukewarm regarding the SOFA agreement. Hashimi’s party, which is the friendliest political organization to the AKP ruling party in Turkey, is not a match to the AL Sahwa confederation. Besides, one must not forget that the majority of the 350,000 strong Iraqi army and police forces are composed of Shiite elements that are loyal to Al Maliki and SCIRI. Sunnis, which can now muster some 135,000 armed elements, are not a match against the Shiite might to which the armed elements of Muqtada Al Sadr must be added. However, the existence of such forces is in itself a recipe for a civil war in the country. This aspect becomes more explosive if the Arab-Kurdish strife is added to it. One must also underline the fact that the Shiite-Kurdish configuration at this time is not as coherent as it used to be under the old regime (where both segments were marginalized). In fact there are many differences between Shiites and Kurds today. The Kurdish armed forces (Peshmerge in Kurdish) number some 90,000 soldiers.
If Iraq’s internal (sectarian) balance is not in equilibrium. If this equilibrium collapses, Turkey will not be spared from the turmoil of the Iraqi internal quagmire. It is for this reason that Turkey must think wisely which side to choose—or not to choose.
It seems that we are on the verge of upsetting events...
